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SITUATION

II

INTERFERENCE WITH SHIPS
States X and Y are at 'var in 1934. Other states are
neutral. States X, Y, N, ~1:, and 0 are parties to the
ashington Treaty Liiniting Naval Arma1nent of 1922
and the London Naval Treaty of 1930.
A private ship-building con1pany in state N, prior to
the ''ar, has built for state X several 20,000-ton unar1ned
,~essels equipped 'vith decks for aircraft landing and flying off, and these vessels have been serving on the high
sea as stations for the regular transoceanic air service bet,veen state X and state ~I.
(a) One of these vessels, the No. 5, "rhich had been
nearly completed in 1929 but on which on account of an
accident and labor troubles construction had been delnyed, having on the day before 'var was declared sailed
under the flag of N for state M in order to install there
certain essential flying-off equip1nent, was Inet at sea the
day after war was declared and before reaching state ~1:,
by the Yoba, a vessel of war of state Y. 'l'he captain
of the Y oba wished to convert the LVo. 5 in11nediately into
rln aircraft carrier to acco1npany the Yoba and accordntgly seized the LVo. 5 and 1nade this conversion.
(b) I£ the Yoba had n1et the LVo. 5 after installing its
e•Juipment in state M, and when .sailing under the flag
of state X ,for X, would the decision be the same as in
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(c) A private shipbuilding co1npany in state R has
co1npleted a vessel of 9,000 tons 'vith 5-inch guns and a
deck for two aircraft, the No. 6, for which state X has
paid but which had not .sailed fro1n R before the decla39
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ration of w·ar. l . . con1n1unicates to R a request that the
LVo. 6 be interned.
(d) The Saba, a merchant Yessel, lawfully flying the
flag of state S is summoned to lie to by a sub1narine of
state X and is visited by a boat fron1 the submarine.
State S has a treaty with state X agreeing to the "deliYering up" of contraband and the l\fa~ter of the Saba
offers to " deliYer up " all contraband maintaining this
is his sole obligation under the conditions. 1"he subluaririe threatens to sink the Saba unless it agrees to
change its course and proceed to port Xena of ~tate X.
''That are the lawful rights of all the parties under
the above conditions~
SOLUTION

(a) The iVo. 5 was on a lawful voyage when 1net by
the Yoba.
The Y oba could seize the 1.V o. 5 and bring her to a
prize court of Y.
Except in the case of urgent military necessity conversion before adjudication 'vould not be la,yful and in any
case full compensation must be 1nade for ~'~ loss.
(b) 1"'he Jro. 5 after installing its equipment in state
l\I and sailing for state X should be brought to a prize
court.
Except in case of urgent military necessity conYersion
before adjudication would not be lawful.
States :X and l\1 have no re~ponsibility nor 'vould Y
have any liability as the iVo. 5 is bound for X, a belligerent destination.
(c) The /fo. 6 should be interned by state R.
The construction .of the iVo. 6 in sta tB R is lawful.
(d) 'fhe Saba is under legal obligation to " deliver
up " the contraband. The Saba is under no legal obligation to agree to change its course and to proceed to port
Xena, though it 'vould be under obligation to go if accompanied by the submarine or in control of a prize cre,v.

TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
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NOTES

Treaties and international la11J.-Treaty is the general
terin used to cover agree1nents bet,Yeen t'vo or more states.
It is understood that to be valid it n1ust be in accord with
the la'v of both of the parties to the treaty and in accord
"With international la,v. Other political entities than
states n1ay enter into international agreen1ents so far as
they haYe capacity under their fundan1ental la,v, and the
treaty-n1aking capacity of son1e states is not unlimited.
Two or 1nore states may enter into a treaty for a sp,ecific
purpose ·which has little or no relation to other states, and
·which may have no bearing on international la\\7 , e. g.,
two states might agree bet\veen then1selves as to the diversion of the 'vaters of a shallow· boundary stream. Two
or In ore states Inight enter into a treaty "Which, 'vhile binding only the parties, might haYe a far-reaching effect
upon other states, e. g., t'vo states n1ight agree upon an
offensive and defensiYe alliance. T,vo or more states
might agree upon principles which should for a specified
period or for specified conditions be considered as binding, e. g., the principles of the Treaty of 'Vashington of
1871 in regard to neutral liability. Such treaties may or
may not be regarded as i1nportant for international la'v,
but they tend to beco1ne significant as precedents and
1nay, as in the case of the principles of the Treaty of
ashington, beco1ne generally accepted as setting forth
international law. 'Vhen a principle once a subject for
treaty negotiation beco1nes generally recognized, it may
be regarded as international law, e. g., inviolability of
a1nba_ssadors.
The most comn1on type of treaty is an international
agreement in 'vhich the parties provide for mutually advantageous conduct or understandings with reference to
one another. Such a treaty as the 'Vashington Treaty
of 1922, limiting naval arma1nent, 1nay have been satisfactory to the parties as putting an end for the ti1ne
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to their co1npetition in naval anna1nent, and the London
N aYal Treaty 1nay ha Ye elaborated these understandings.
T11ese treaties 'vould not necessarily create any legal obligations for nonparty states, nor forn1 bases for principles of international la""", though the policies of third
states 1night be 1nodified by the obligations assumed by
the party states.
The states party to a treaty have an international obligation to observe the provisions of a treaty into "Thich
they have entered, though there is often a difference of
opinion as to the interpretation of the provisions. There
could not be any legal objection raised 'vhen a state avails
itself of the provisions of a treaty in accord "Tith 'vhich
it n1ay n1odify its relations to the other parties to the
treaty, or by actual denunciation in accord with the provisions of the treaty may put an end to all its obligations
under the treaty. 'Treaties concluded in perpetuity, or
'vithout provision for revision or denunciation, have
usually been causes of international disputes and
n1isunderstandings.
Air(ff'aft station vessel.-There 1nay be a distinction
between an aircraft station vessel and a seadron1e, as the
aircraft station vessel is itself capable of navigation and
comes within the category of vessels, while the seadrome
is a structure for a specific purpose. The status of the
seadro1ne 'vould therefore be subject to different laws
fron1 those governing vessels.
''Thile an aircraft station vessel n1ight not be pri1narily
designed for an aircraft carrier, such a vessel n1ight be
transforn1able into an aircraft carrier. No intention to
furnish an aircraft carrier to a belligerent could be based
si1nply on the fact of pre-war construction of an aircraft
station vessel of a type already in use for maritime aircraft stations on a line between tw·o states.
Further there is no limitation upon the tonnage of
such vessels in any treaty, as these vessels are not constructed for war purposes. It 1nay be doubtful 'vhether
one belligerent, when both belligerents were parties to
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Hague Convention VI of 1907 relating to status of
enemy 1nerchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities,
would be justified in detaining in its O\Yn ports at the outbreak of \Var such a vessel under the provisions of article
V, which reads:
"The present Convention does not affect merchant-ships whose
build shows that they are intended for conYersion into vessels
(tf war."

If the build of an aircraft station vessel did not show
that it was intended for conversion into a vessel of \Var,
articles 2 and 3 of the convention proYides that if such a
vessel is detained in a belligerent port or 1net at sea and
is requisitioned, there 1nust be payn1ent of co1npensation.
In the discussion at the N a Yal ,,.,. ar College in 1932
artificial structures and 1nariti1ne jurisdiction " . ere considered and it " ras pointed out that a seatlron1e as located
at a defined place at sea \Vould be different in character
fro1n an aircraft vessel fron1 the nature of its construction and possible use. The seadro1ne as a fixed structure
would haYe rather 1nore of the attributes usually associated \Vith land jurisdiction \Yhile the a j rcraft vessel \Yould
in the 1nain be under mariti1ne rules even though, if permanently located at a specified place at sea, the jurisdiction n1ight be soine\vhat Inodified fro1n that exercised
over a vessel navigating under ordinary circtunstances.
Aircraft carrier.-In the 'Vashington Treaty on the
Limitation of Ar1nainent, 1922. Chapter II, Part 4, "Aircraft Carrier " \Yas defined as follo\YS:
"An aircraft carrier is defined as a vessel of war with a displacement in excess of 10,000 tons ( 10,160 1netric tons) standard
displace1nent designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of
carrying aircraft. It must be so constructed that aircraft can
be launched therefron1 and landed thereon, and not designed and
constructed for carrying a more vowerful armament than that
allowed to it under Article IX or Article X as the case may be."
(1921 Naval 'Var College, International Law Documents, p. 322.. )

This definition \Vas replaced in the
Treaty, 1930, Article 3, by the follo,ving :

I..~ondon

Naval
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" 'The expression " aircraft carrier" includes any surface Yessel
of war, wbateYer its displacement, designed for the svecific and
exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft and so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefron1 and landed thereon.' " (1930
NaYal -nrar College, International Law Situations, p. 144.)

This definition o:£ 1930 is specifically limited to " vessels o:£ war " and in the sa1ne article there is provision
that the fitting o£ a landing-on or flying-off plat£orn1 or
deck on a capital ship, cruiser, or destroyer not designed
cr adapted exclusively as an aircraft carrier, 'vould not
rnake these vessels chargeable against aircraft tonnage.
Regulations of United States, 191.!;.-Shortly after the
declaration of 'Yar in 1914, the United States as a neutral
issued instructions in regard to :foreign vessels in ports
of the ·united States. The :follo"ring telegraphic instruction ''as sent in early August to the collector o£
customs of the port o:f New York:
"' HaYe representatiYe of each foreign Yessel in your port
certify to this Department whether she is a merchant Yessel intended solely for the carriage of passengers and freight, exclud·ing munitions of war, or whether she is a part of the armed
force of her nation. This information is for lH1l'l10se of maintaining the neutrality of the United States under recent proclamation
President. Clearance will be refused in absence of this certificate.
" ' ".,.ire Department before issuing clearance papers to foreign
Yessels unless you are satisfied after careful inspection that ship
bas not n1ade any preparations while in 11ort tending in any way
to her conversion into a Yessel of war. Taking on abnorn1al
amount of coal, except in case of colliers, would indicate such
conYersion. Unpacking of guns already on board would be conclusiYe. Painting of Yessel a war color would indicate conYersion.
It must be clear that she is not to be used for transportation
recruits or reserYes for a foreign army or navy. This does not
preYent transportation of passengers in usual sense, as where
there are women and children and men of different nationalities
eYen though among them there were a few reserYes "·ithout your
knowledge. If her passengers are nearly all men nnd practically
all of snme nationality, clearance cannot be granted. It tnust be
unquestionable that she has no arms or munitions of war
aboard.'., (Foreign Relations, U. S., 1914 Supp1ement, p. 5D5.)

AMERICAN ATTITUDE, 1914
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Such instructions had been preceded by a cotntn unicati~n of the British charge d'affaires of August 4, 1914, in
which he said to the Secretary of State:
"SIR: His ~Iajesty's Government have been informed that the
German vessel I(ronprinz lVilheln~ sailed from New York on the
night of the 3d of August, without passengers, but with a heavy
load of coal, 7,000 tons, and fitted with t'vo long-range guns. Her
superstructure had also been painted gray. All these preparations
were n1ade before the vessel left United States waters.
"It is a matter of common knowledge that similar preparations
are being made on board other German vessels, notably the Vaterland and the Barbarossa, in United States ports, and they will no
doubt attempt to adopt the same tactics as the Kronprinz Wilheln~.
"In view of the state of war now existing between Great Britain
and Germany I have the honour, under instructions from Sir Edward Grey, to call your 1nost serious attention to the action taken
in regard to these Yessels and to urge the United States Government to take immediate steps to prevent these and other such
vessels leaving United States waters "·ithout passengers and after
carrying out such obviously warlike preparations as described
above, which, when carried out in neutral w,aters, constitute a distinct breach of the la,vs of neutrality." (Ibid, p. 594.)

In reply for the Secretary of State, ~1r. Lansing said:
· "SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your note No. 254 dated
August 4, 1914, 11 p.m., but presented to the Department on the
following day, on the subject of the equipment and sailing of the
Kronprinz Wilheln~ from New York on the night of the 3d instant,
and of preparations being made on board the German vessels
Vaterland· and Barbarossa in United States ports.
"Under instructions from Sir Edward Grey you call my attention, in view of the state of war existing between Great Britain
and Germany·, ' to the action taken in regard to these vessels and
to urge the United States Govern1nent to take immediate steps
to prevent these and other such vessels leaving United States
waters without passengers and after carrying out such obviously
warlike preparations as described above, which, when carried out
in neutral waters, constitute a distinct breach of the laws of neutrality.'
"In reply I have the honor to inform you that as the instance
of the Kronprinz Wilhelm occurred, as you say, on the 3d instant
before the declaration of war with Germany had been issued by
the British Government, it would appear that the state1nent in
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~·our last })aragraph quoted aboYe has no application to the case
of that Yessel.
''As to the attitude of the United States Government toward
the other Yessels mentio11e<l in your note I haYe the honor to
atlYise you that these ye~sels are, and haYe been for ~ome time,
under the surYeillance of United States authorities with a vie\Vl
to IH'eYenting a brea('h hy them of the neutrality of the United
States. The Department is adYise<l that these vessels hnYe not
as :ret left American waters.
" "\Yith reference to your statement quoted aboYe as to what in
the opinion of His Britannic :Majesty's Government may be considered as constituting a breach of the la\YS of neutrality in cases
of this character, I have the honor to refer you to my note of thelUth instant relating in son1e respects to the rights and duties of
tl:ie United States as a neutral power during the pending Europ<:an wars." (Ibid. p. 602.)

LVaval vessel in port.-,Vhile under the 'V ashington
Treaty of 1922 on Lilnitation of Naval Arinainent, Article XI, there was a restriction upon the construction by
one of the contracting parties for another contracting
party of vessels of \var exceeding 10,000 tons clisplacenlent, this provision did not apply to non-contracting
parties. By article 8 of the London Naval Treaty of
1930, the exe1nption on the ground of tonnage is somewhat further restricted and more definite provisions are
enumerated as to equipment.
Though the parties to the specific provisions of the·
ashington and London treaties would be bound by the
provisions of these treaties and though states not parties
to these treaties would not be bound by the treaties as
such, all parties would be bound by the principles of
international law.
The rules in regard to intern1nent of vessels of \var
are coinparatiYely modern rules, and Hague Convention
XIII, Article 24, provides for internment of a vessel of
\Yar \Yith its officers and cre\V. '"fhe instructions of states
in regard to internment usually provide for Yessels of
\Yar w·hich ha Ye entered neutral ports after the outbreak
of \Yar. The regulations in regard to sub1narines issued
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during the 'Vorld 'Var 1nainly contemplated the entrance
of ar1ned and com1nissioned vessels.
A vessel which is in a neutral port, completed, armed,
and paid for by one of the belligerents but not yet 1nanned
or co1mnissioned may be a potential threat to the other
belligerent. It n1ight quickly become an instrument of
war if conveyed outside of neutral jurisdiction and so
long as it remains within neutral jurisdiction it is safe
fron1 capture. In order that this protection afforded by
neutral jurisdiction 1nay not be used by one belligerent
to the advantage of one as against the other, it has been customary to require that neutrals sho'v due diligence in
supervising activities tending to aid either belligerent
along certain well-defined lines in furnishing and equipping ships.
The Somers, 1898.-A torpedo boat, the So1ners, belonging to the United States, had, during the 'var with
Spain in 1898, been stored at Falmouth, England. In
N oven1ber 1898, after active hostilities had ceased and before the treaty of peace had been signed, the United States
desired to bring the Son1ers from England and requested
per1nission fro1n the British Govern1nent stating that" in
case of resu1nption of hostilities with Spain this vessel will
not be 1nade use of."
After considering the A1nerican proposition, the
British Govern1nent through the Foreign Office said on
Dece1nber 8, 1898:
"In vie\v of this assurance I have the honor to state that Her
l\Iajesty's Government are glad to comply with your request, and
that the necessary instructions will at once be sent to the proper
authorities in order to facilitate the departure of the vessel."
(Foreign Relations, U. S., 1898, p., 1007.)

American attitude on subn2arines, 1930.-At the London Naval Conference in 1930, the me1nbers of the ..._-\.meriean delegation endeavored by speeches over the radio
and otherwise to make known, not merely to the Conference, but to the world at large, their attitude upon questions before the Conference. The chair1nan of the
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A1nerican delegation on February 6 stated to the press
that " Our delegation is in agreement on every ite1n of
<>ur program", and at the end .of the Conference this was
reaffirmed.
~..\..t the plenary ses,sion of the Conference on February
11, he said:
"The essential objection to the submarine is that it is a
weapon particularly susceptible to abuse, that it is susceptible of
use against merchant ships in a \Vay that violates alike the laws
of war and the dictates of humanity. The use made of the submarine revolted the conscience of the world, and the threat of its
unrestricted use against merchant ships was what finally determined the entry of my country into the conflict. In the light of
our experience it seems clear that in any future war those who
employ the submarine will be under strong temptation, perhaps
irresistible temptation, to use it in the way that is most effective
for immediate purposes, regardless of consequences. These considerations convince us that technical arguments should be set aside
in order that the submarine n1ay henceforth be abolished. We
have come to the conclusion that our problem is, whether in this
day and age, and after the experiences of the last war, the nations
at this conference are justified in continuing to build these instruments of warfare, thereby assuming responsibility for the risk of
repeating in any possible future wars the inhumane activities
which have been condemned by the verdict of history.
"It seems to the American Delegation that we have a common
interest in the abolition of the submarine; first of all, for the purpose of suppressing costly weapons which we can forego by agreement and by the abolition of which we reduce our requirements in
other classes of ships; and, second, for the purpose of elilninating
f or the future the dreadful experiences of the past.
"The American Delegation, therefore, urges that we set aside
purely technical considerations and give careful study to the possibility of eliminating this \Vhole problem." (Publications of the
Department of State, Conference Series Xo. 3, pp. 21-22.)

On the proposition of the French delegation on that
day, the five powers agreed to place the use of submarines '
11nder the same rules as the use o£ surface vessels of war,
though there has been question as to whether the article
of the treaty drafted for the purpose accon1plished that
€ncl.
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In a radio address on February 16, 1930, Senator Robinson, a 1nember of the A1nerican delegation, stated the
French proposition as that:
"all of the nations should agree that hereafter submarines shall
be forbidden to attack merchant ships, except after visitation and
search, and provision made for the safety of passengers and crew
in the same way that international law requires surface vessels
to do." (Ibid, p. 26.)

Treaty agreement on rules for submarines, 1930.-The
London Naval Conference agreed upon rules for the
conduct of submarines as regards merchant vessels in
part IV, article 22, which states:
"The following are accepted ns established rules of Internadonal Law:
" ( 1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines
rnust conform to the rules of International Law to which surfac-e
Yessels are subject.
" (2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to
stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit
or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may
not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel with0Ut having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a
place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers
3.nd crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions,
by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which
i~ in a position to take them on board."
"The High Contracting Parties invite all other Powers to
express their assent to the above rules." (Publications of the Department of State, Conference Series, No. 2, p. 16)

In a pan1phlet issued in 1930 by the Departlnent of
State containing a digest of the treaty it was said:
"Part IV. (This part applies to the United States, Great Britain~
France, Italy, and Japan.)
"ARTICLE 2.2. This article specifies that sub1narines must conform to the rules of international law to which surface vessels
are subject regarding merchant ships, and further provides that
any warship (whether surface vessel or submarine) must not
sink or render incapable of navigation, a merchant vessel without
first having placed the passengers, crew, and ship's papers in a
place of safety, except when such n1erchant vessel persistently re-
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fuses to stop on being duly summoned or actively resists visit or
searrh. It also provides that the Inerchant ship's boats are not
regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers
and crew is assured under existing conditions by the proximity of
land or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to
take them on board.
"All the powers not party to the treaty are invited by this article
to express their assent to the above rules." (Publications of the
Department of State, Conference Series, No. 4, p. 9.)

This part of the treaty is to "re1nain in force 'vithout
Inn it of ti1ne."
'"rhe earlier rules to "~hich it 1nay be presun1ed this
article 2:2· refers are in regard to visit and search, though
in 'Yording this article is con1prehensive and refers to all
action of " surface vessels " " "~ith regard to 1nerchant
ships." It is also prestunecl that article 22 in Inentioning
'~ surface vessels " intended to include all types though
in preceding articles it has been custo1nary to refer specifically to "surface vessels of 'Yar " or even " naval surface
co1nbatant vessels."
Question 1nay be raised as to action on the part of a
Iner<.:hant vessel of an enen1y or of a neutral 'vhich n1ight
constitute "persistent refusal " to stop on being " duly
sununoned " or " active resistance."
The instructions for the X a vy of the United States of
~Tune 1917 state:
"47. If the summoned vessel resists or takes to flight she may
be pursued and brought to by forcible measures if necessary."

T'he lJnitecl States has regarded resistance or flight as
ground for using force sufficient to cause the 1nerchant
vessel to lie to for visit and search, but not as ground for
sinking the vessel. Of course the n1erchant vessel might
be sunk in the exercise of the right, but the use of force
'vas held to be restricted to that necessary to bring the
vessel to, and forcible resistance by the merchant vessel
'vas not in itself a ground for sinking the 1nerchant vessel,
but a just ground for its condemnation.
As by the explanations and re1narks of those negotiating the treaty, the intent ·was to restrict the action of
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subn1arines in order that they should conform to the accepted rules for surface vessels under international la,v,
it 'vould be unwise for any naval officer to be less strict in
interpretation of the rules of international la 'v in regard
to the use of force in connection 'vith visit and search
than prior to 1930. In other 'vords, the 1nerchant vessel
might be "brought to by forcible n1easures if necessary"
and such measures should be strictly limited to that end,
as more extreme action must depend upon other considerations, some of 'vhich may rest upon the results of the visit
and search for which the n1erchant vessel is brought to.
Hitherto even in case of flight or " persistent refusal
to stop " sinking of a merchant vessel 'vould not be
approved if the vessel could other,vise be ;:;topped, and
sinking in case of " active resistance " or of resistance
would be only a last resort. It cannot be prestuned that
those are in error 'vho " . .ould read the treaty as follow~:
( 1) In general, in their action with regard to merchant ships,
submarines must confonn to the rules of International Law to
which surface vessels are subject, but
(2) In particular, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, rnay not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and.
ship's papers in a place of safety, except in the case of persistent
refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to
visit or search.

Sending in of seized vessels.-The "sending in" of
prizes 'vas understood to involve the placing of a prize
crew on board the vessel seized and the navigating_ of the
ves;:;el to the nearest convenient prize court, or the escorting o.f the vessel to such port by the capturing vessel.
Detailed instructions 'vere given for this action. In this
action the 'viii of the captain 'vas substituted for that of
the ma;:;ter of the seized vessel and the responsibility 'vas
correspondingly shifted.
Gradually, ,vith the abolition of privateering, and the
increase in size and speed of public and private vessels,
the " sending in " of seized vessels beca1ne n1uch 1nore of
a problem. A prize cre,v, if it could be ;:;pared, 1night
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be unable to control the n1oyements of a 1noclern Yessel
of large tonnage, and a submarine could not spare a crew.
Escorting a vessel under n1odern conditions "·here aid
n1ight be slunmoned by the seized vessel by radio would
make the escorting perilous. The results of bringing the
seized vessel in, either as to the material goods condemned to the captor, or kept from the other belligerent,
would ordinarily be slight as compared to the loss of
time and the risk involved in the operation.
The risk of attack by sub1narine or other hostile force
during the "delivering up" of goods at sea has made
this procedure of doubtful Yalue and expediency in most
cases.
It " .. as but natural that other methods should be suggested and resorted to in recent years, when the character of vessels of war and of peace had becon1e so unlike
in n1any respects as compared with those of the early
nineteenth century.
Recent practice and suggestions.-Article 48 of the unratified Declaration of London of 1909 e1nbodied the general opinion of that period upon the treabnent of neutral
vessels seized as prize. It said that:
"A captured neutral \esse! is not to be destroyed by the captor,
but must be taken into such port as is proper in order to determine
there the rights as regards the Yalidity of the capture."

Article 49, however, made an exception in regard to a
vessel which w·ould be liable to conden1nation in case the
taking in of the seized vessel " would involve danger to
the ship of war or to the success of the operations in 'vhich
she is at the ti1ne engaged." In the general report of the
conference, 'vhich had official ·weight, it was held that
danger n1ust exist " at the mo1nent when the destruction
takes place." The arglunent being in part that as the
ship "·as already practically lost to the owner, being
liable to condemnation, it 'vould inYolYe no further loss
to him but "·ould constitute the destruction of belligerent
property by the belligerent. Article 50 provided for placing the persons on board and the ship's papers in safety
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before destruction, and the exceptional e1nergency had
ahvays to be proved before any suit for condemnation
'vould have effect, and this 'vas to be proved "in a manner to 1neet the opposition of the neutral"; otherwise com~
pensation "\Vas due the neutral. Other liabilities also
guarded against destruction, and for innocent goods destroyed compensation 1nust be made. There had been
much discussion of this subject. Lord Sto,vell in 1819
had declared that destruction could be justified only "by
a full restitution in value", (The Felicity, 2 Dodson
Ad1niralty Reports, 381) and there had been a general
opinion against destruction (1D11 Naval "\Var College, International IJa"\V Situations, pp. 51-98). r.rhe Italian
Governrnent had applied the provisions of the Declarations of London in its war "\vith Turkey in 1911.
As the Declaration of London 'vas operative only during the early W'eeks of the ''Torld "\Var, new considerations arose.
It 'Yas proposed by son1e that each merchant vessel
~hould be examined prior to departure :from a port, and
be certified as to the character and as to the nature o:f
its cargo, thus putting a heavy burden and responsibility
upon the neutral. The difficulty of effective enforcement
o:f any such insurance as to the nature of a cargo was
often evident during the period while the prohibition
·of in1portation of alcohol into the United States was in
force. It was also evident that one of the belligerents
might be benefited while the other 1night be injured by
such a rule, and that in some cases 'veak states not accustomed to being or not able to be self -sufficient might
be placed at great relative disadvantage or be put to
great expense to become self-sufficient in materials essential in time o:f "\var.
Sequestration in a neutral port penqing the decision
G:f a prize court 'vas frequently proposed before and during the "\Vorld vVar, and there were some treaties which
provided for such sequestration. It has been argued
with so1ne force that during the 'Vorld War the position
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of Great Britain and its allies w·ould have been strengthened if sequestration had been the rule on the ground
that neutral shipping which "~as sunk 1night have been
sequestrated :for a time, and innocent cargo and shipping would have been freed. In any case there "·ould
haYe been less irritation o:f neutrals, and with ships "·hich
had been sequestra ted in their ports there would be possibilities o:f bringing pressure upon belligerents disregarding the laws o:f war.
Such a proposition as this, n1ade in regard to sequestration. n1ay, as is the case in the proposition in regard
to certification. be an indirect recognition that destruction
o:f a seized vessel is approved. Destruction~ according to
accepted law is unlawful, save under \ery exceptional circunlstances. ...\.nother and frequently 1nade suggestion
has been that subn1arines be banned. but this suggestion
need not be seriously considered while naval treaties enlbody present provisions.
The rule as e1nbodied in article 22 of the London X a val
'J'reaty, 1930~ practically restricts the use o:f the subJnarine to that o:f a surface cruiser as regards vessels o:f
co1n1nerce. while leaving the subn1arine unrestricted as
regards vessels o:f war~ n1aking it once n1ore essential
that vessels o:f war and vessels o:f con11nerce be clearly
distinguished and distinguishable. It cannot easily be
presu1ned that arn1ed merchant ves,sels could be toler-·
ated "·bile subn1arines should be required to con:fonn to
article 22.
Delivery of contraband.-The subject o:f delivery o£
contraband at sea was considered at length in International Law Situations, 1911, pages 99-110. It was there
shown that early treaties pern1itted ma.sters o:f n1erchant
vessels to " agree, consent, and offer to deliver '' coiltraband goods, ''hen the~e :formed a part o:f the cargo, after
,,·hich they might proceed.
Gradually, limitations began to be inserted recognizing
the difficulties o:f delivering cargoes at sea, as in article
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18 o.f the treaty between the United States and Brazil,
of 1828, in which it was said:
" . . . :Xo vessel of either of the two nations shall be detained on the high seas on account of having on board articles of
contraband, wheneYer the master, captain, or supercargo of said
Yessels "·in deliYer up the articles of contraband to the captor,
unless the quantity of such articles be so great and of so large
a bulk that they cannot be receiYed on board the capturing ship
without great inconvenience; but in this and all the other cases
of just detention the vessel detained shall be sent to the nearest
convenient and safe port, for trial and judgment, according to
la.w." ( 8 U. S. Statutes, p. 39-!.)

ProYisions to the sa1ne effect appear in many treaties
of the nineteenth century, but to,vard the end of the century there ''as a growing support for the position that
prize court proceedings should. be essential in the change
of title to goods seized as prize. Article 44 of the unratified Declaration of London, 1909, provided for the deliYery of contraband under certain circlunstances if it was
not of an an1ount sufficient to rnake the Yessel itself liable
to conde1nnation. Other provisions in regard to delivery
of contraband at sea "·ere also discussed, _b ut difficulties
of a practical nature 'vere often advanced in opposition
to the extension of the practice by general agree1nent of
the na Yal powers.
The actual form upon which the London Naval Conference agreed in the Declaration of London in 1909 was
as follo"-rs :
4-!. A vessel stoppe<l becam;;e carrying contraband, and
not liable to condemnation on account of the proportion of contraband, may, according to circumstances, be allowed to continue
her voyage if the master is ready to deliv~r the contraband to
the belligerent ship.
"The delivery of the contraband is to be entered by the ca11tor
on the logbook of the vessel stopped, and the master of the vessel
must furnish the captor duly certified copies of all rele"Vant papers.
"The captor is at liberty to destro~" the contraband ,yhich is thus
delivered to him." (1909 :Xaval \Var College, International Law
Topics, p. 95. )
"ARTICLE
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rrhe report of the British delegation to Sir Edward
Grey showed the course of discussion at the conference,
.1nd so1ne of the reasons for the adoption of article 44.
"18. Careful consideration was giYen to the question, raised
in paragraph 33 of our instructions, whether any sa tisfactor:r
arrangement could be devised for allowing the imn1ediate removal
hy the captor of any contraband found on board a neutral Yessel.
Proposals were put forward by several delegations. The 1nost
far-reaching one was one submitted by Austria-Hungary, under
which the neutral Yessel carrying contraband was to be given
the right to proceed on her way without further 1nolestation if
the master was ready to hand over the contraband to the captor
on the spot, a proviso being added which made it necessary that
tlle subsequent decision of a prize court should intervene in
(•rder either to validate the transact1on or to decree compensation where the captor should have been proved to have acted
wrongfully. In this form, the proposal did not 1neet with general support. It was objected that to concede an absolute right
in the terms to the neutral would constitute an unjustifiable interference with the legitimate rights of belligerents, and that, Inoreover, the rule would be found in practice un,vorkable. The Conference therefore fell back upon the cia use now embodied in the
Declaration as article 44, which goes no further than authorizing
tbe handing over of contraband, or its destruction, on the spot,
by common agreement between captor and neutral, subject to the
subsequent reference of the case to the prize court. It is not
anticipated that it will be possible to apply this rule in very
numerous instances, as, under modern conditions of maritime
con1merce, the transshipment or destruction of cargo on the high
seas is likely in most cases to present serious or insuperable diffl.culties. But, so far as it goes, the rule may afford a welcome
measure of relief in favorable circumstances. (Parliamentary
Papers, :Miscellaneous, No. 4, 1909, International Naval Conference, Cd. 4554, p. 97.)

Regulations during the lV orld 1Var.-The instructions
to naval officers in the period 1914-1918 and earlier in the
nineteenth century contain provisions e1nbodying in large
1neasure the principles of the Declaration of London.
This is evident in such provisions as the Japanese regulations governing capture at sea of 1914, article 70 of \Yhich
provides:

DIFFICULTIES OF DELIVERY

57

"A vessel stopped because carrying contraband, and not liable
to condemnation on account of the proportion of contraband, may,
according to circumstances, be allowed to continue her voyage if
the master is ready to deliver the contraband to the belligerent
ship. The delivery of the contraband is to be entered by the
captor on the log book of the vessel stopped, and the master of
the vessel must furnish the captor duly certified copies of all
relevant papers. The captor shall prepare a document in dupli·
cate according to Form No. 6 with regard to kinds of contraband
and shall give one copy to the master of the vessel. The captor
is at liberty to destroy the contraband which is thus delivered
to him." (1925 Naval War College, International Law Documents,
p. 166.)

The Instructions issued by the United States in June
1917, article 86, provide that "if circumstances preclude
such delivery of the contraband cargo, the vessel should
in general be sent in."
Difficulties of delirvering cargoes at sea.-At the time
when treaties relating to the delivery of cargoes at sea
'vere made, fron1 the seventeenth to the middle of the
nineteenth century, there was a considerable equality in
size and in other respects between vessels engaged in war
and vessels engaged in co1nmerce. Often the amount of
cargo liable to condemnation, if the merchant vessel
should be taken in, might be insignificant as com pared
with the whole cargo, or as compared with the expense or
inconvenience of taking the vessel in even though there
\vas no question as to the strict right to take the vessel to a
prize court. \Vith vie'v to meeting such conditions 'vithout unduly inconveniencing either party, these early
treaties inserted such provisions as article 7 of the treaty
of February 24, 1676-77, bet,veen Great Britain and
France, which said :
"If the vessel is laden but in part with contraband goods, and
the master thereof offers to put then1 in the captor's hands, the
captor shall not then oblige him to go into any port, but shall suffer
him to continue his Yoyage." (1911 NaYal 'Var College, International Law Situations, p. 100.)
4448-36--5
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It " ·as early recognized that there n1ight be grave risks
and possibilities of irregularities if delivery of cargo at
~ea "·as not carefully safeguarded, and later treaties \Vere
elaborated to 1neet these contingencies. Gradually, such
treaty provisions becan1e less frequent, but regulations
for the conduct of naval \Yar even during the orld ''Tar
provided for delivery of cargo at sea. Son1e of these
follo\v closely article 44 of the unratified declaration of
London of lf>09. and provide that the conunander of the
visiting vessel1nay destroy the contraband \vhich has been
cJelivered to hin1.
It \Vas maintained that resort to delivery of contraband subjected the visiting vessel to undue risk, as the
change in conditions due to speed of ves~els, use of radio,
nnd of sub1narines and other mQdern instrtnnents in war
rendered the reasons for delivering up of contraband at
sea no longer valid. Even if this be true, it \vas contended that this did not give one belligerent a right to
change the la,vs of \Var during the period of \Var. Then
belligerents began to advance the doc~rine of reprisal as
bas~ of their acts, disregarding the fact that reprisal
gave no ground for lin1iting the rights of neutrals,
though neutrals might be liable to inconvenience or other
incidental consequences of acts o.f reprisal aimed directly
at one belligerent by the other.
" Proceed a3 dh·ected."-In the unratified treaty in
relation to the use of subn1arines and noxious gases
in \varfare, dra \Vn up at the ""\~V ashington Conference in
1922, under article I \Yas the clause:

'T

"A merchant vessel must not be a ttaeked unlf'SS it rrfuse to
submit to Yisit and search after warning, or to proceed as directed after seizure.''

The Institute of International I~a'v in lf>13 differentiated ~eizure and capture: Seizure in time of war is the
taking possession of a vessel or goods \Yith or \Vithout the
n~sent of the master, not necessarily involving bringing
the n1atter to a prize court; capture implies that the
authority of the captor is substituted for the authority
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of the n1aster of the ca pturecl Yes,sel, though the ultimate
disposition of the vessel and cargo may rest in the prize
court. The definitions of the Institute imply that seizure when applied to a cargo may involve detaining the
Yessel pending decision of the prize court upon the
liability of the cargo to condemnation.
There may be exigencies which would justify seizure of
a neutral merchant Yessel and immediate use of a part or
the "Thole of its cargo, but these exigencies should be imInecliate and compelling and in such cases inventories
n1ust be made and care n1ust be taken to aYoid liabilities
other than for pay1nent for cargo taken.
Such state1nents as "Tere made in regard to seizures in
British orders in council during the \Vorlcl \i'\T ar were not
staten1ents of new,. principles of international la,Y, but of
\Yhat the British authorities proposed to do or 'vhat they
had clone "Then neutrals confined their opposition to the
\Yriting of notes protesting such practices. Referring to
the period su bseqnent to the Gern1an war zone declaration of Jan nary 3L 1917, the British \Yar Cabinet reported:
" Two steps were taken to deal with the situation. In the first
place the Blockade Onler in Coundl of the 16th February, 1917,
was issued. the effect of whith was to rnake vessels trading to and
from neutr'al ports in ~urope liable to the risk of capture and condemnation if they were found attempting to eYade calling for
examination at a British port; and, in the second place, it was
mmonnced through the public press that neutral vessels would, on
certain conditions, be allowed the privilege of calling for examination at certain British ports outside the United Kingdom such as
Halifax in XoYa ·Scotia instead of at l(irkwall, and that British
bunker conl would only be allowed to those neutral vessels which
undertook to call at an appointed British port and perfonn certain
serviee:-; iu return. Concurrently with these rneasures insurance
on favorable terms was laid open to all vessels engaged in trading
in the Allied interests, an<.l His 1\Iajesty's Government further
offered to hire or purehase lart!:e blocks of neutral :-;hip11ing.
"These expe<lients have, on the whole, worl{ed exceedingly well.
There has been no serious attempt to break the blockade; and, on
the other hand, the power to give or refuse what are called Halifax
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facilities-that is to say, the privilege of being examined outside
the danger zone-has furnished us with a powerful inducement to
neutral shipowners to cmnply with the various blockade and shipl1ing requirements that 've ha\e put forward." (1918 Naval 'Var
College, International Law Documents, p. 94.)

''Thile there 'Yas in internationalla'v no rule requiring
vessels voluntarily to go to a belligerent port of
either belligerent for examination, such action n1ight be
made advantageous by exempting from liability the vessels 'vhich had conformed to the order, or coal and other
supplies might be 'vithheld fron1 vessels which had not
conformed to the order. If neutral vessels proceed to
belligerent ports for examination for their o'vn convenience or advantage, they cannot complain on account of
delay or risks encountered. Neither can they complain
if on reasonable suspicion they are taken in by a prize
crew or escorted in by a vessel of the belligerent forces.
The ordering of a neutral merchant vessel to proceed
to a named port without prize crew or escort is beyond
the legal competence o.f a belligerent, and the 1nerchant
vessel incurs no liability for disregarding such order and
.is under no obligation to agree to proceed by itself to a
port named by a belligerent vjsiting vessel.
If the submarine had the right to order the Saba to
agree to proceed to port Xena of state X under penalty
o.f being ,sunk, it might be maintained that the submarine
might by radio transmit such orders to all neutral
n1erchant vessels at sea., and then sink such as were not
obeying the order. Manifestly no such practice is upheld by international law.
The obligation to "proceed as directed" would therefore, ii 'vi thin the lawful rights of belligerents, in1ply
that the directing force was on board the neutral merchant vessel in_ a priz~ crew or escorting the vessel as by
an accompanying cruiser.
Threat by government agent.-The commander of the
submarine is a government agent of the state. His ,vord
r~outral
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js in effect the expression o:f the will o:f his state. State
X is responsible for the acts o£ the co1nmanders o£ its
submarines. The master o:f the Saba may know that a
submarine commander's right to regulate the movements
o£ a neutral merchant vessel under the circumstances prevailing in the case o:f the Saba are limited to placing a
prize crew on board, or escorting the Saba to port, thus
maintaining a continuing effective control.
The authority o£ the commander of a belligerent vessel
of war is limited by the degree o:f :force at his disposal.
I£ he cannot spare a prize crew, or cannot leave the area
o£ his operations to escort a prize to port, he must release
the vessel and any action beyond this is in excess o:f his
la ,v:ful authority, unless permitted by treaty agreement
to 'vhich the belligerent state and the neutral state con('(•rned are parties. The Saba would be under obligation
by treaty to "deliver up" the contraband. The Saba
'vould be under no lawful obligation to agree to change
Its course or to proceed to Xena, nor would an agreement
1r1ade under such compulsion be valid.
The commander o:f the submarine has no lawful authority to make or to enforce a threat to sink the Saba
because it does not agree to change its course and proceed
to Xena.
SOLUTION

(a) The l\1o. 5 'vas on a lawful voyage when met by the
1'oba.
The Y oba could seize the No. 5 and bring her to a prize
court o£ Y.
Except in the case o£ urgent military necessity conversion before adjudication would not be lawful and in any
case :full co1npensation must be made :for N's loss.
(b) The 1.Vo. 5 after installing its equipment in state M
and sailing :for state X should be brought to a prize court.
Except in case o:f urgent military necessity conversion
before adjudication 'vould not be lawful.
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States X and ~I have no responsibility nor 'vould Y
have any responsibility as the LVo. 5 is bound for X, a
belligerent destination.
(c) The LVo. 6 should be interned by stateR.
The construction of the LVo. 6 in stateR is la,vful.
(d) The Saba is under legal obligation to "deliver up "
the contraband. The Saba is under no legal obligation
to agree to change its course and to proceed to port Xena,
though it "·oulcl be under obligation to go if a~contpanied
by the sub1narine or in control of a prize crew.

